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Introduction 
 
In the early 1990s, two scholars pronounced Japan a “donor of consequence” (Orr and 
Koppel, 1993: 1), at a time when it was becoming the largest bilateral aid donor in the world. In the 
last twenty years Japan has experienced the limitations of development assistance, as a tool both of 
development and foreign policy, and as a public policy vulnerable to fiscal restraints. As of this 
writing Japan’s net ODA volume has fallen to fifth place in the DAC, with aid budgets now roughly 
half of what they were during their peak in the late 1990s. Foreign aid as a proportion of gross 
national income is about what it was in the mid-1970s, a time when Japan was just emerging as a 
major aid donor. 
While the drastic reduction in Japan’s aid volume no doubt has limited its impact on world 
aid trends, it has also had the effect of forcing aid officialdom to consider the purposes of aid clearly. 
Thus, the decline in aid volume has been accompanied by sustained consideration of aid philosophy 
and improvement of aid effectiveness. As of this writing the government has formulated four ODA 
charters (1992, 2003, 2010, and 2013) outlining basic purposes and strategies of aid. 
Japan’s aid to Latin America and the Caribbean has reflected these changes in aid thinking. 
Japan’s aid to the region has always been modest in comparison to aid to Asia and, more recently 
Africa, but the relatively smaller amount of aid with proportionally fewer projects highlights two 
new trends in Japanese aid since 2000: the adoption of human security as an organizing principle of 
aid and an as-yet tentative attempt to engage former aid recipients as partners in so-called triangular 
or South-south development cooperation. This article investigates Japan’s aid to Latin America and 
the Caribbean in terms of three themes: aid and human security, promotion of South-south 
                                                  
1 A version of this article was presented at the 18th Pan-American Nikkei Association meeting in Santo Domingo, 
Dominican Republic, August 7-9, 2015. The author is grateful for support from the Pache II-B and Pache 1-A-2 (2015) 
research grants which made that presentation and subsequent research for this article possible. 
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Those that remain on the list cluster in the Upper Middle Income category with less priority than 
Africa, parts of Asia, and the South Pacific microstates in terms of economic need. 
Table 2. Distribution of LAC Countries on the DAC  
List of ODA Recipients, 2014-16 
Development level Number 
Least Developed 1 
Other Low Developed 0 
Lower Middle Income 6 
Upper Middle Income 22 
 Source: DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for Reporting on 2014, 2015, 
   and 2016 Flows. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm.  Accessed 5/23/2015. 
Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries. 
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002: 27. 
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development cooperation, and the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development cooperation in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japan’s Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Since its inception in the 1960s Japan’s foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had 
developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” inspired by Japanese Ministry of 
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled out of Latin America and international attention shifted to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecting larger repayment of outstanding yen loans than new 
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South Korea together provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the 
Organization of American States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proportion of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo Hakusho 2010. 
 
There are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s development assistance 
program. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influence. A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Japan’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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       Table 3. Regional Allocations of Human Security Trust Fund Projects, 2002-2014 
Region  Number 
76
59
25
21
4 
9
16 
Asia
Africa
Latin America and Caribbean 
Europe
Middle East 
Oceania
Global, other 
   Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human 
 Security. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assitance.html.  
 Accessed December 14, 2014. Author compilation.  
Table 5 presents data on LAC country and type of project by year during the same period. 
The following points are clear from the data. First, consistent with the comprehensive approach to 
development embodied in human security, projects tend to combine human rights with social 
development. Trust Fund assistance to Latin America also addresses both aspects of human security 
as identified by the UN: freedom from want and freedom from fear. On the latter point, assistance 
has tended to focus on civil violence and policing. Second, there is a consistent disaster relief and 
preparedness component, reflecting Japan’s comparative advantage in this kind of technology. 
Table 4. Human Security Trust Fund Projects in LAC, 2002-2014 
Year Country Purpose 
2014 Paraguay Community development, human security 
awareness 
2014 Peru Crime reduction, social development 
2013 Ecuador Conflict, human trafficking 
2012 Mexico Migrant human security 
2012 Nicaragua Multisectoral human security 
2012 Dominican Republic Bateyes residents security 
2011 Bolivia Natural disaster resilience 
2010 Colombia IDP rights, livelihood stabilization 
2009 Latin America Human rights awareness 
2008 Brazil Anti-violence, welfare 
2008 Honduras Violence against women and children 
2008 Bolivia Maternal health, human rights 
2006 Grenada Post-hurricane reconstruction 
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human security as a key component of Japanese foreign policy based on a non-military approach to 
cultivating international political influence without contravening Article 9 of the constitution 
(Fukushima and Tow 2009: 173; Sato 2009: 85, 87). After 2000, the government extended the 
concept of human security to the consolidation of peace in conflict-affected countries, which has 
allowed aid officials to identify links between security and development. Aid for conflict prevention 
henceforth supported governance, emergency humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction plans, partnership with NGOs, assistance for social reintegration of demobilized 
soldiers, refugees, and internally displaced persons, and regulation and collection of small arms 
(Ibid. 1). The government formally incorporated human security into the revised ODA Charter in 
2003, and it has remained a key aid principle in all subsequent charters. Aid, therefore, has also 
taken on a more humanitarian aspect. Quantitative evidence has identified humanitarian 
considerations in Japanese foreign aid especially since the 1990s (Tuman, Strand, and Emmert 
2009). 
The concept of human security was also attractive for Japanese aid policy-makers because 
security could be aligned with Japan’s existing foreign policy doctrine, allowing it to contribute to 
the maintenance of international security without having to reinterpret Article 9 of the constitution 
or increase military spending. The issues identified in the human security agenda, moreover, were 
amenable to action through existing ODA programs. Japan’s aid for human security has tended to 
focus on the economic and social dimensions of the concept, notably poverty and economic crisis, 
rather than on its applicability to organized conflict (Lam 2006; Soeya 2005). Reconstruction after 
natural disasters and disaster prevention have also been identified as human security issues. 
The UNTFHS in Latin America and the Caribbean 
The most visible augmentation of budgetary resources in support of human security occurred 
in multilateral aid programs. In 1999, Obuchi was instrumental in establishing the UN Trust Fund 
for Human Security (UNTFHS). Because Japan contributes practically all of the funds to the 
UNTFHS and closely oversees its activities and projects, the Fund is regarded as a “Japan Fund” 
and other donors have been reluctant to join it. The decision-making process is such that Japan 
through MOFA had a de facto veto over aid allocations (Carvalho and Potter 2015: 90).  
Since it began formal operations in 2002 UNTFHS has funded projects in all regions of the 
world. Table 4 shows the regional distribution of those projects between 2002 and the end of 2014.
A total of 210 projects were funded, of which 25 were carried out in the LAC, placing the region 
third in the world after Asia and Africa. It is worth noting that while LAC representation in this 
fund appears modest, the countries of the region accounted for fully half of the projects funded from 
2011 to 2014. 
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private banks pulled out of Latin America and international attention shifted to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecting larger repayment of outstanding yen loans than new 
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South Korea together provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the 
Organization of American States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proportion of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo Hakusho 2010. 
 
There are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s development assistance 
program. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influence. A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Japan’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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       Table 3. Regional Allocations of Human Security Trust Fund Projects, 2002-2014 
Region  Number 
76
59
25
21
4 
9
16 
Asia
Africa
Latin America and Caribbean 
Europe
Middle East 
Oceania
Global, other 
   Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human 
 Security. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assitance.html.  
 Accessed December 14, 2014. Author compilation.  
Table 5 presents data on LAC country and type of project by year during the same period. 
The following points are clear from the data. First, consistent with the comprehensive approach to 
development embodied in human security, projects tend to combine human rights with social 
development. Trust Fund assistance to Latin America also addresses both aspects of human security 
as identified by the UN: freedom from want and freedom from fear. On the latter point, assistance 
has tended to focus on civil violence and policing. Second, there is a consistent disaster relief and 
preparedness component, reflecting Japan’s comparative advantage in this kind of technology. 
Table 4. Human Security Trust Fund Projects in LAC, 2002-2014 
Year Country Purpose 
2014 Paraguay Community development, human security 
awareness 
2014 Peru Crime reduction, social development 
2013 Ecuador Conflict, human trafficking 
2012 Mexico Migrant human security 
2012 Nicaragua Multisectoral human security 
2012 Dominican Republic Bateyes residents security 
2011 Bolivia Natural disaster resilience 
2010 Colombia IDP rights, livelihood stabilization 
2009 Latin America Human rights awareness 
2008 Brazil Anti-violence, welfare 
2008 Honduras Violence against women and children 
2008 Bolivia Maternal health, human rights 
2006 Grenada Post-hurricane reconstruction 
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human security as a key component of Japanese foreign policy based on a non-military approach to 
cultivating international political influence without contravening Article 9 of the constitution 
(Fukushima and Tow 2009: 173; Sato 2009: 85, 87). After 2000, the government extended the 
concept of human security to the consolidation of peace in conflict-affected countries, which has 
allowed aid officials to identify links between security and development. Aid for conflict prevention 
henceforth supported governance, emergency humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction plans, partnership with NGOs, assistance for social reintegration of demobilized 
soldiers, refugees, and internally displaced persons, and regulation and collection of small arms 
(Ibid. 1). The government formally incorporated human security into the revised ODA Charter in 
2003, and it has remained a key aid principle in all subsequent charters. Aid, therefore, has also 
taken on a more humanitarian aspect. Quantitative evidence has identified humanitarian 
considerations in Japanese foreign aid especially since the 1990s (Tuman, Strand, and Emmert 
2009). 
The concept of human security was also attractive for Japanese aid policy-makers because 
security could be aligned with Japan’s existing foreign policy doctrine, allowing it to contribute to 
the maintenance of international security without having to reinterpret Article 9 of the constitution 
or increase military spending. The issues identified in the human security agenda, moreover, were 
amenable to action through existing ODA programs. Japan’s aid for human security has tended to 
focus on the economic and social dimensions of the concept, notably poverty and economic crisis, 
rather than on its applicability to organized conflict (Lam 2006; Soeya 2005). Reconstruction after 
natural disasters and disaster prevention have also been identified as human security issues. 
The UNTFHS in Latin America and the Caribbean 
The most visible augmentation of budgetary resources in support of human security occurred 
in multilateral aid programs. In 1999, Obuchi was instrumental in establishing the UN Trust Fund 
for Human Security (UNTFHS). Because Japan contributes practically all of the funds to the 
UNTFHS and closely oversees its activities and projects, the Fund is regarded as a “Japan Fund” 
and other donors have been reluctant to join it. The decision-making process is such that Japan 
through MOFA had a de facto veto over aid allocations (Carvalho and Potter 2015: 90).  
Since it began formal operations in 2002 UNTFHS has funded projects in all regions of the 
world. Table 4 shows the regional distribution of those projects between 2002 and the end of 2014.
A total of 210 projects were funded, of which 25 were carried out in the LAC, placing the region 
third in the world after Asia and Africa. It is worth noting that while LAC representation in this 
fund appears modest, the countries of the region accounted for fully half of the projects funded from 
2011 to 2014. 
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Those that remain on the list cluster in the Upper Middle Income category with less priority t an
Africa, parts of Asia, and the South Pacific microstates in te ms of economic need. 
 
                     Table 2. Distribution of LAC Cou tries on the DAC  
List of ODA Rec pients, 2014-16 
D velopment level Number 
Least Developed 1 
Other Low Developed 0 
Lower Middle Income 6 
Upper Middle Income 22 
                       Source: DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for Reporting on 2014, 2015,  
                         and 2016 Flows. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm.  Accessed 5/23/2015. 
 
Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
                                                  
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002: 27.  
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development cooperation, nd the possibilities for close  ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development cooperation in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japan’s Aid to L tin America and the Caribbean 
 
Since its inception in the 1960s Japan’s foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had 
developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” inspired by Japanese Ministry of 
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled out of Latin America and international attention shifted to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecting larger repayment of outstanding yen loans than new 
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South Korea together provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the 
Organization of American States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proportion of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo Hakusho 2010. 
 
There are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s development assistance 
program. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influence. A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Japan’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Haiti 64
93 
23
Dominican Republic 
Jamaica
  Source: Gaimusho Keizai Kyouryokukyoku, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo (ODA) 
  Kunibetsu Deetabuku, 2010, 2013.  
Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not provide detailed sectoral data on 
grassroots human security grant aid in its annual ODA country data book. Embassy instructions to 
prospective applicants list poverty reduction, primary health, education, environment, and natural 
disaster response as priority areas3. A brief survey of ten grassroots human security grant aid 
projects to Jamaica from 2005 to 2014 found that they supported livelihood improvement through 
agricultural cooperatives and small business development, health and welfare improvement through 
hospital and fire-fighting assistance, and primary and secondary education and vocational training. 
A grassroots human security grant project in the Dominican Republic surveyed by a Diet delegation 
in 2010 supported local primary school construction. This is consistent with the freedom from want 
approach to human security and is in line with the human security aid profile Lam Peng Er found in 
Southeast Asia (Lam 2009). 
Technical Assistance and South-south Cooperation 
Long ignored by scholars of development assistance, so-called South-south technical 
cooperation has reemerged in development circles in recent years. This renewed attention has been 
driven in no small part by the growing importance of the newly emerging economies and non-DAC 
donors in international financial flows including aid. South-south cooperation has a number of 
attractive features for a donor like Japan. First, it enables Japan to continue to use development 
assistance as a tool to promote both development and diplomatic relations with countries that no 
longer require large amounts of aid themselves. Brazil and Mexico are prime examples of such 
countries.  Second, it allows Japan to leverage limited aid resources. Third, it is consistent with 
Japan’s aid philosophy of development through self-effort. Finally, it builds on Japan’s comparative 
advantage in the region; technical assistance has comprised a relatively higher proportion of aid to 
LAC than either grant or loan aid. 
JICA identifies two types of such cooperation. First, triangular cooperation involves 
cooperation between Japan and a former aid recipient in the provision of technical assistance to a 
current aid recipient. Second, South-south cooperation is understood as the provision of aid by a 
former aid recipient to a third country based on lessons and skills transferred to the former recipient 
by prior Japanese aid projects. To date, direct South-south cooperation between Japan and LAC has 
3 Embassy of Japan in Jamaica, 2005. 
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2006 Peru Women’s health 
2006 Peru Disaster relief improvement 
2006 Ecuador Refugee livelihood 
2006 Honduras Violence against women 
2005 El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras 
Sexual violence, human rights 
2004 Colombia IDPs 
2004 Cuba HIV/AIDS 
2003 Caribbean (16 countries) Disaster relief improvement 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Assistances through the Trust Fund for Human Security.  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/assitance.html. Accessed December 14, 2014.   
Author compilation. 
In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers the bilateral Grassroots Human 
Security Grant program, the lone bilateral aid budget line dedicated to human security. Grant 
allocations are made directly by Japanese embassies to projects proposed by NGOs and local 
administrative units. Table 5 shows project allocations to LAC countries from 2005-2012. As the 
data makes clear, projects are typically small-scale with correspondingly greater numbers of 
projects than the UNTFHS. Interestingly, Grass Roots Human Security grants make up a significant 
proportion of total bilateral grant aid to relatively high income countries like Argentina, Brazil, and 
Jamaica with lower proportions of total aid projects in countries like Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras. Haiti, which arguably has the greatest human security and development 
needs in the hemisphere, ranks low on both types of grant aid. 
Table 5. Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid in  
Selected Countries, 2005-2012 
Country Number of projects 
28
307
278
43
142
235
280
55
283
242
Argentina
Ecuador
Colombia
Peru
Paraguay
Bolivia
Brazil
Panama
Nicaragua
Honduras
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Those that remain on the list cluster in the Upper Middle Income category with less priority than 
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Thir , Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Jap n’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC r gi ’s sh r  of Japan’s bilateral aid h s iminished, Japan’s position 
mong the DAC donors has also diminish d: in LAC it is n  longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donor , notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Sinc  
2000 J pan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobi rnidad’s s ction, 
“Imagen de algunos actores int rnacionales,” unlike the Unit d States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report o  aid to Ecu dor found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japa ’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce r port on for ign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contrib tion  to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest i  and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
                                                  
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002: 27.  
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development cooperation, and the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development cooperation in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japa ’s Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Si ce its inception in the 1960s Japan’s foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had 
developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to sia comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America a d the Middle East each recei ing about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises f the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” inspired by Japanese Ministry of 
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private ba ks pulled out of Latin America and inter ational attention shifted to the Middle East and 
frica. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position n t only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecting larger repayment of outstanding yen loans than new 
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South Korea together provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the 
Organization of American States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proportion of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihts  Enjo Hakusho 2010. 
 
There are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s dev lopment assistan e
program. First, the United States h s been the dominant powe  in the region and Japan has therefore
tended to defer t  it in what the Japanese governmen  has viewed as the American sphere of
influence. A survey of the literature on J pan’s economic cooperation wit  LAC even a  its height in
the la e 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Japan’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather a a triangular relationship involving Jap n, LAC, nd the Unit d
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderso 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Ka ad
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and Caribbean have
relatively high l vels of onomic development. According to the DAC, Antigu  and Barbud ,
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not provide detailed sectoral data on 
grassroots human security grant aid in its annual ODA country data book. Embassy instructions to 
prospective applicants list poverty reduction, primary health, education, environment, and natural 
disaster response as priority areas3. A brief survey of ten grassroots human security grant aid 
projects to Jamaica from 2005 to 2014 found that they supported livelihood improvement through 
agricultural cooperatives and small business development, health and welfare improvement through 
hospital and fire-fighting assistance, and primary and secondary education and vocational training. 
A grassroots human security grant project in the Dominican Republic surveyed by a Diet delegation 
in 2010 supported local primary school construction. This is consistent with the freedom from want 
approach to human security and is in line with the human security aid profile Lam Peng Er found in 
Southeast Asia (Lam 2009). 
Technical Assistance and South-south Cooperation 
Long ignored by scholars of development assistance, so-called South-south technical 
cooperation has reemerged in development circles in recent years. This renewed attention has been 
driven in no small part by the growing importance of the newly emerging economies and non-DAC 
donors in international financial flows including aid. South-south cooperation has a number of 
attractive features for a donor like Japan. First, it enables Japan to continue to use development 
assistance as a tool to promote both development and diplomatic relations with countries that no 
longer require large amounts of aid themselves. Brazil and Mexico are prime examples of such 
countries.  Second, it allows Japan to leverage limited aid resources. Third, it is consistent with 
Japan’s aid philosophy of development through self-effort. Finally, it builds on Japan’s comparative 
advantage in the region; technical assistance has comprised a relatively higher proportion of aid to 
LAC than either grant or loan aid. 
JICA identifies two types of such cooperation. First, triangular cooperation involves 
cooperation between Japan and a former aid recipient in the provision of technical assistance to a 
current aid recipient. Second, South-south cooperation is understood as the provision of aid by a 
former aid recipient to a third country based on lessons and skills transferred to the former recipient 
by prior Japanese aid projects. To date, direct South-south cooperation between Japan and LAC has 
3 Embassy of Japan in Jamaica, 2005. 
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In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers the bilateral Grassroots Human 
Security Grant program, the lone bilateral aid budget line dedicated to human security. Grant 
allocations are made directly by Japanese embassies to projects proposed by NGOs and local 
administrative units. Table 5 shows project allocations to LAC countries from 2005-2012. As the 
data makes clear, projects are typically small-scale with correspondingly greater numbers of 
projects than the UNTFHS. Interestingly, Grass Roots Human Security grants make up a significant 
proportion of total bilateral grant aid to relatively high income countries like Argentina, Brazil, and 
Jamaica with lower proportions of total aid projects in countries like Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras. Haiti, which arguably has the greatest human security and development 
needs in the hemisphere, ranks low on both types of grant aid. 
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its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contrib tion  to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest i  and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
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The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
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development cooperation, and the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
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developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to sia comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America a d the Middle East each recei ing about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises f the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” inspired by Japanese Ministry of 
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private ba ks pulled out of Latin America and inter ational attention shifted to the Middle East and 
frica. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position n t only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecting larger repayment of outstanding yen loans than new 
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South Korea together provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the 
Organization of American States. 
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2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and Caribbean have
relatively high l vels of onomic development. According to the DAC, Antigu  and Barbud ,
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Japan’s Aid in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Potential for 
Enhancement of Cooperation with the Nikkei Community 
 
Diaspora communities have long been understood as conduits of economic and other 
intercourse between countries connected by their immigrant histories. Recently, for example, 
diaspora philanthropy and remittance studies have pointed to the importance of remittances and 
philanthropic charity to home countries. The scholarly and policy attention concerning the Japanese 
diaspora in Latin America, however, still largely focuses on the economic, cultural, and social 
development of Japanese emigrant communities in LAC (Suzuki 1992; Hirabayashi, 
Kikumura-Yano, and Hirabayashi 2002; Yanagida 2002; Masterson and Funada-Clausen 2004; 
Adachi 2006; Toyama 2006), Japanese state policy toward emigration (Endoh 2009), or problems 
encountered by Nikkeis returning to Japan more or less for the long term6. Notably lacking is a 
concern for Nikkeis as agents in Japan’s foreign aid program. Yet, that community is distinctive 
because it is part of the foreign aid program: JICA, in its capacity as facilitator of overseas 
emigration, devotes a fair amount of energy and resources to support of educational and welfare 
services for Nikkei emigrants. Administration of assistance for Nikkei communities and ODA for 
the countries in which they reside are separated formally7, but there is likely to be overlap at the 
field level. They also participate in technical training programs administered either at home or in 
Japan. The Nikkei community, therefore, is not simply a labor supply or a labor problem. 
There appears to be a change of official thinking about the roles of Nikkei communities in 
Japan’s economic development cooperation policy. The 2002 task force report on Japan’s foreign 
policy, cited above, is one example The 2011 ODA White Paper notes that “many years of Japan's 
economic cooperation have also allowed it to cooperate with Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, 
which are now entering the stage as influential actors to provide assistance to third countries such as 
Latin American and African countries under the schemes of Third Country Training Programme 
and Third Country Expert Dispatch. For example, Japan works together with Brazil to provide 
agricultural development projects to Mozambique in Africa. Japan also works with Mexico, 
Argentina, and the Dominican Republic to provide assistance in the reconstruction process after the 
earthquake in Haiti” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 109). A 2012 evaluation of Japan’s aid to 
Peru also suggests a possible rethinking of Japan’s aid and economic cooperation with the country. 
The evaluation rates Japan’s ODA highly and then goes on to suggest the enhancement of bilateral 
diplomatic relations through use of aid clearly as a diplomatic tool and “reinforcement of 
coordination among Japanese Peruvians, private sectors and ODA. Maintaining and expanding the 
network with Japanese Peruvians continues to be crucial in contemplating diplomatic relations 
between Japan and Peru. Accordingly, MOFA should examine the way of cooperation between 
Japan and Japanese Peruvians in its ODA for Peru” (International Development Center of Japan 
                                                  
6 See for example Reis, 2001; Roth, 2002; de Carvalho, 2003; Tsuda, 2003. 
7 This was confirmed by officials from both JICA and the Kaigai Nikkei Kyoukai. 
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been limited to Mexico and Brazil. This pattern of cooperation is still relatively new, dating from 
1985 in the case of Brazil but 2003 with Mexico. Japan-Brazil cooperation has developed to the 
fullest extent, with nearly twenty joint projects undertaken to date. A highlight of this cooperation 
has been the introduction of Japan’s famous koban police system to Sao Paolo State as a traditional 
technical assistance program involving dispatch of Japanese policemen to train Brazilian 
counterparts. Based on that, since 2005 Brazilian police have spread this type of policing to Central 
America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) with JICA support. JICA 
notes that this kind of cooperation has the twin advantages that Central American police share a 
common language and similar cultural and social backgrounds, and also face common development 
challenges4. Thus, we can identify both triangular and South-south cooperation in this process. 
A second major project involves South-south cooperation for agricultural development 
assistance in Mozambique using techniques development for a similar climate in Brazil and 
originally supported by JICA (Horisaka 2012: 186-187; Murosawa 2013). As Portuguese is the 
common language of Brazil and Mozambique, this project lowers transaction costs for Japanese aid 
in a region of the world identified as a priority for development assistance.  
A third project involves medical cooperation that has developed from Japan’s medical 
technical assistance. As of this writing this kind of cooperation remains limited to Brazil but has the 
potential to expand further. 
Japan-Brazil triangular and South-south cooperation is facilitated by two factors. First, Brazil 
is an emerging donor in its own right, which means it has a development assistance budget and an 
agency with which to cooperate. Second, Brazil is “home to a large number of ethnic Japanese 
engineers and researchers that are active as experts” (ibid.). This pattern of cooperation resembles 
recent cooperation with South Korea’s development assistance program in which similarity of aid 
administration and development philosophy and a history of technical assistance from donor to 
recipient has evolved into a relationship of joint donor cooperation5. 
Mexican-Japanese triangular cooperation has been slower to develop. The Japan-Mexico 
Partnership Program was inaugurated in 2003 with the objective of strengthening bilateral technical 
cooperation and extending it to third countries. Triangular cooperation has been limited to the 
TAISHIN project, carried out between 2003 and 2008, which provided technical assistance in 
constructing earthquake-resistant housing in El Salvador. The project was based on Japanese 
technical assistance to Mexico in the 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
4 JICA, 2014. 
5 See Kim and Potter, 2012. 
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Those that remain on the list cluster in the Upper Middl  Income category with l ss priority than
Africa, parts of Asia, and the South Pacific microstates in terms of econom c need. 
                   Table 2. Distrib tion of LAC Countries on the DAC  
List of ODA Recipients, 2014-16 
Development leve  Number 
Leas  Developed 1 
Other Low Developed 0 
Lower Middle Income 6 
Upper Middle Income 22 
                       Source: DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for Reporting on 2014, 2015,  
                         and 2016 Flows. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm.  Accessed 5/23/2015. 
 
Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can ake use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
                                                
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002: 27.  
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development cooperation, nd the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development cooperation in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japa ’s Aid to Latin Am ica and the Ca ibbean 
 
Since its incepti n in the 1960s Japan’  foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had
evel ped a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia c mprising roughly 70 percent of tot
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the inter ational response to the Latin
merican debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Br dy Plan” inspired by Japanese Ministry of
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; K tada and Solis 2010). H wev , in the 1990s, Japanese
private banks pull d out of Latin America and nternational ttention s ifted to the Middle East and
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decre sed to its former levels and then dipped below 10
percent in the lat  1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to th
United States but th  European Unio , Spa n, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net
aid t  the region was negative, refl cting larger rep yment of outstanding yen loans than new
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for reg onal dev lopment is modest:
 and South Korea ogether provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). S nce 2010 J pan has n t made a subscriptio  to the
Organizati  of Am rican States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proportion of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo H kusho 2010. 
 
There are s veral reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japa ’s development assistanc  
program. First, the United States has bee  the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what t e Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influ nce. A survey of the literature on Jap ’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Jap n’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relati n hip involving Jap n, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purc ll and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be see  in Table 2, the countries of L tin America and the aribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Japan’s Aid in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Potential for 
Enhancement of Cooperation with the Nikkei Community 
 
Diaspora communities have long been understood as conduits of economic and other 
intercourse between countries connected by their immigrant histories. Recently, for example, 
diaspora philanthropy and remittance studies have pointed to the importance of remittances and 
philanthropic charity to home countries. The scholarly and policy attention concerning the Japanese 
diaspora in Latin America, however, still largely focuses on the economic, cultural, and social 
development of Japanese emigrant communities in LAC (Suzuki 1992; Hirabayashi, 
Kikumura-Yano, and Hirabayashi 2002; Yanagida 2002; Masterson and Funada-Clausen 2004; 
Adachi 2006; Toyama 2006), Japanese state policy toward emigration (Endoh 2009), or problems 
encountered by Nikkeis returning to Japan more or less for the long term6. Notably lacking is a 
concern for Nikkeis as agents in Japan’s foreign aid program. Yet, that community is distinctive 
because it is part of the foreign aid program: JICA, in its capacity as facilitator of overseas 
emigration, devotes a fair amount of energy and resources to support of educational and welfare 
services for Nikkei emigrants. Administration of assistance for Nikkei communities and ODA for 
the countries in which they reside are separated formally7, but there is likely to be overlap at the 
field level. They also participate in technical training programs administered either at home or in 
Japan. The Nikkei community, therefore, is not simply a labor supply or a labor problem. 
There appears to be a change of official thinking about the roles of Nikkei communities in 
Japan’s economic development cooperation policy. The 2002 task force report on Japan’s foreign 
policy, cited above, is one example The 2011 ODA White Paper notes that “many years of Japan's 
economic cooperation have also allowed it to cooperate with Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, 
which are now entering the stage as influential actors to provide assistance to third countries such as 
Latin American and African countries under the schemes of Third Country Training Programme 
and Third Country Expert Dispatch. For example, Japan works together with Brazil to provide 
agricultural development projects to Mozambique in Africa. Japan also works with Mexico, 
Argentina, and the Dominican Republic to provide assistance in the reconstruction process after the 
earthquake in Haiti” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 109). A 2012 evaluation of Japan’s aid to 
Peru also suggests a possible rethinking of Japan’s aid and economic cooperation with the country. 
The evaluation rates Japan’s ODA highly and then goes on to suggest the enhancement of bilateral 
diplomatic relations through use of aid clearly as a diplomatic tool and “reinforcement of 
coordination among Japanese Peruvians, private sectors and ODA. Maintaining and expanding the 
network with Japanese Peruvians continues to be crucial in contemplating diplomatic relations 
between Japan and Peru. Accordingly, MOFA should examine the way of cooperation between 
Japan and Japanese Peruvians in its ODA for Peru” (International Development Center of Japan 
                                                  
6 See for example Reis, 2001; Roth, 2002; de Carvalho, 2003; Tsuda, 2003. 
7 This was confirmed by officials from both JICA and the Kaigai Nikkei Kyoukai. 
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been limited to Mexico and Brazil. This pattern of cooperation is still relatively new, dating from 
1985 in the case of Brazil but 2003 with Mexico. Japan-Brazil cooperation has developed to the 
fullest extent, with nearly twenty joint projects undertaken to date. A highlight of this cooperation 
has been the introduction of Japan’s famous koban police system to Sao Paolo State as a traditional 
technical assistance program involving dispatch of Japanese policemen to train Brazilian 
counterparts. Based on that, since 2005 Brazilian police have spread this type of policing to Central 
America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) with JICA support. JICA 
notes that this kind of cooperation has the twin advantages that Central American police share a 
common language and similar cultural and social backgrounds, and also face common development 
challenges4. Thus, we can identify both triangular and South-south cooperation in this process. 
A second major project involves South-south cooperation for agricultural development 
assistance in Mozambique using techniques development for a similar climate in Brazil and 
originally supported by JICA (Horisaka 2012: 186-187; Murosawa 2013). As Portuguese is the 
common language of Brazil and Mozambique, this project lowers transaction costs for Japanese aid 
in a region of the world identified as a priority for development assistance.  
A third project involves medical cooperation that has developed from Japan’s medical 
technical assistance. As of this writing this kind of cooperation remains limited to Brazil but has the 
potential to expand further. 
Japan-Brazil triangular and South-south cooperation is facilitated by two factors. First, Brazil 
is an emerging donor in its own right, which means it has a development assistance budget and an 
agency with which to cooperate. Second, Brazil is “home to a large number of ethnic Japanese 
engineers and researchers that are active as experts” (ibid.). This pattern of cooperation resembles 
recent cooperation with South Korea’s development assistance program in which similarity of aid 
administration and development philosophy and a history of technical assistance from donor to 
recipient has evolved into a relationship of joint donor cooperation5. 
Mexican-Japanese triangular cooperation has been slower to develop. The Japan-Mexico 
Partnership Program was inaugurated in 2003 with the objective of strengthening bilateral technical 
cooperation and extending it to third countries. Triangular cooperation has been limited to the 
TAISHIN project, carried out between 2003 and 2008, which provided technical assistance in 
constructing earthquake-resistant housing in El Salvador. The project was based on Japanese 
technical assistance to Mexico in the 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
4 JICA, 2014. 
5 See Kim and Potter, 2012. 
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Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can ake use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
                                                
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002: 27.  
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development cooperation, nd the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development cooperation in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japa ’s Aid to Latin Am ica and the Ca ibbean 
 
Since its incepti n in the 1960s Japan’  foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had
evel ped a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia c mprising roughly 70 percent of tot
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the inter ational response to the Latin
merican debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Br dy Plan” inspired by Japanese Ministry of
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; K tada and Solis 2010). H wev , in the 1990s, Japanese
private banks pull d out of Latin America and nternational ttention s ifted to the Middle East and
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decre sed to its former levels and then dipped below 10
percent in the lat  1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to th
United States but th  European Unio , Spa n, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net
aid t  the region was negative, refl cting larger rep yment of outstanding yen loans than new
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for reg onal dev lopment is modest:
 and South Korea ogether provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). S nce 2010 J pan has n t made a subscriptio  to the
Organizati  of Am rican States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proportion of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo H kusho 2010. 
 
There are s veral reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japa ’s development assistanc  
program. First, the United States has bee  the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what t e Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influ nce. A survey of the literature on Jap ’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Jap n’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relati n hip involving Jap n, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purc ll and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be see  in Table 2, the countries of L tin America and the aribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Fourth, the discussion of South-south technical cooperation above suggests that another 
fruitful role for Nikkei communities in LAC is to cooperate with Japan and their own governments 
in the provision of technical assistance to other countries in the region. The 2010 report notes active 
Nikkei participation in triangular cooperation with Brazil (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 13). 
The 2012 evaluation of Peru also notes that “Japanese Peruvians are acting as a third-country expert 
(sic) in South-South Cooperation in Brazil. Although Peru’s situation does not yet allow 
South-South Cooperation, it would be meaningful in the long term to determine now if cooperation 
with Japanese Peruvians will be possible in Peru” (International Development Center of Japan 2012: 
16). 
These last two roles have not been systematically studied even though they offer rich 
possibilities for thinking about positive contributions of the Nikkei community in the administration 
of Japanese aid. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As development assistance to LAC continues to remain of secondary importance to Japan and, 
concurrently, new aid donors are emerging in the region, the question is whether Japanese 
officialdom can make maximum use of the potential intermediary role of Nikkei communities in 
linking these two trends. Traditional aid of the kind outlined in the first part of this paper will 
continue to have positive but limited impacts on LAC development. Possible and current roles of 
Nikkei communities in development assistance might include the following. 1) Nikkei communities 
are beneficiaries of ODA, for example as sites of schools that receive Youth Volunteers for Nikkei 
Communities or which send trainees to Japan. 2) Nikkei communities act as advocates for bilateral 
economic cooperation, including aid. 3) Nikkeis might act as policymakers in the bilateral 
development assistance policy making process. Former president Fujimori would be the outstanding 
example of this type of role. 4) The discussion of South-south technical cooperation above suggests 
that the most fruitful role for Nikkei communities in LAC is to cooperate with Japan and their own 
governments in the provision of technical assistance to other countries in the region. To date, the 
first and fourth roles are most in evidence, with the first, Nikkeis as beneficiaries of technical 
assistance, the most prominent. 
However, it is not clear how effective these overseas communities are in the promotion of 
diplomatic and economic relations. JICA’s development assistance and emigration responsibilities 
remain formally separated, which makes seamless policy making between the two fields 
problematic. Nor is it clear whether the LAC Nikkei communities are interested in fulfilling such 
roles. The Dominican Republic is the site of one of Japan’s least successful migration policies, with 
emigrants in the end demanding reparations from the Government. Many first-generation 
immigrants are likely to view the Japanese government as the source of their difficulties rather than 
as a partner in the development of their newly adopted country. Peru is a more complicated case of 
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2012: ii).  
The author discerns four current and possible roles of Nikkei communities in development 
assistance. First, Nikkei communities are beneficiaries of ODA, for example as sites of schools that 
receive Youth Volunteers for Nikkei Communities or which send trainees to Japan. Support for 
Nikkei social development is included in the ODA budget, and the Youth Volunteers for Nikkei 
Communities program is part of the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers program. Second, 
Nikkei communities act as advocates for bilateral economic cooperation, including aid. The 2012 
Country Evaluation of Peru, cited above, made exactly this point. A 2010 Country Assistance 
Evaluation for Brazil noted the same in that country: “the Nikkei can be seen as an important asset 
for Japan in providing ODA to and building a strong partnership with Brazil, as their community as 
a whole has achieved remarkable development, in contrast with the previous situation in which they 
were mainly a target of Japan’s assistance” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 13). A 2004 JICA 
study on aid to Bolivia notes the same for the Nikkei community there (Institute for International 
Cooperation 2004: 37). 
Third, Nikkeis might act as policymakers in the bilateral development assistance policy 
making process. Former president Fujimori would be the outstanding example of this type of role. 
At the project level, the Nikkei presence is more widespread even as it is underappreciated. The 
Brazil Country Study notes that “the existence of immigrants from Japan and their descendants 
(Nikkei) in Brazil is a decisive factor promoting effective (aid) implementation. For instance, the 
development and dissemination of an agroforestry system in Northern Brazil, which has been 
contributing to forest conservation in the Amazon, could not have been possible without Nikkei 
farmers of Tomé-Açu in the State of Pará. Nikkei have participated in various technical cooperation 
projects as specialists or interpreter-cum-coordinators, facilitating technology transfer to and 
communication with Brazilian counterparts” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 13). In the Bolivian 
case, the 2004 report observes that “owing to the existence of Japanese associations in Bolivia, 
NGOs and Japanese local governments that intend to carry out international cooperation activities 
in Bolivia can easily find local partners. This may well promote public participation in cooperation 
projects…” (Institute for International Cooperation 2004: 37). Given the fact that evaluations of the 
Grassroots Human Security Grant program have pointed to the importance of assessing the capacity 
of local partner organizations in the effectiveness of project implementation, the presence of a 
known community familiar with Japanese organizations has the potential to enhance that important 
aid program in the region. 
The presence of Nikkei staff in JICA offices is an unremarked but important element of daily 
operations in LAC countries. Just under one half of the clerical staff of the JICA office in Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic, for example, are Nikkei hired locally. Like the Brazilian Nikkei 
noted above these staff members act as interpreters and project negotiators, fulfilling an important 
linkage function between the JICA office and its Dominican government counterparts8. 
                                                  
8 Author interview with JICA officials, Santo Domingo, August 10, 2015. 
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Those that remain on the list cluster in the Upper Middle Income category with less priority than 
Africa, parts of Asia, and the South Pacific microstates in terms of econ ic need. 
 
                     Table 2. Distribution of LAC Countries on he DAC  
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Develo ment level Number 
Least Developed 1 
Other Low Developed 0 
Lower Middle Income 6 
Upper Middle Income 22 
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                         and 2016 Flows. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm.  Accessed 5/23/2015. 
 
Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Pri e Minister Obuchi announced 
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime M ister, 2002: 27.  
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development cooperation, a d the possibili ies for closer ties wi h the Nikkei community in LAC
development cooperat on in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japan’s Aid to Latin America and the C r bbean 
 
ince its inc ption in the 1960s Jap ’s fore gn aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had
developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asi  comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international respons  to th  Latin
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” inspired b Japanese Ministry f
Fin nce policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled out of Latin America and international attention shifted to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spai , and Germany as w ll. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, fl ctin  larger repayment of outstandi g yen loans th n w
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest:
Japa  and South Korea toge her provide about five p rce t of the Inter-Americ n Bank
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the
Organ zation of American States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proporti n of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo Hakusho 2010. 
 
Th re are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s d velopment assistanc  
progr m. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and J pan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influence. A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view J pan’s presence in the region not a  
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell nd Imm rman 1992; And rson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be s en in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribb an have 
relatively high levels f economic development. According t  th  DAC, Antig a and Barbuda, 
Chile, a d Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Fourth, the discussion of South-south technical cooperation above suggests that another 
fruitful role for Nikkei communities in LAC is to cooperate with Japan and their own governments 
in the provision of technical assistance to other countries in the region. The 2010 report notes active 
Nikkei participation in triangular cooperation with Brazil (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 13). 
The 2012 evaluation of Peru also notes that “Japanese Peruvians are acting as a third-country expert 
(sic) in South-South Cooperation in Brazil. Although Peru’s situation does not yet allow 
South-South Cooperation, it would be meaningful in the long term to determine now if cooperation 
with Japanese Peruvians will be possible in Peru” (International Development Center of Japan 2012: 
16). 
These last two roles have not been systematically studied even though they offer rich 
possibilities for thinking about positive contributions of the Nikkei community in the administration 
of Japanese aid. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As development assistance to LAC continues to remain of secondary importance to Japan and, 
concurrently, new aid donors are emerging in the region, the question is whether Japanese 
officialdom can make maximum use of the potential intermediary role of Nikkei communities in 
linking these two trends. Traditional aid of the kind outlined in the first part of this paper will 
continue to have positive but limited impacts on LAC development. Possible and current roles of 
Nikkei communities in development assistance might include the following. 1) Nikkei communities 
are beneficiaries of ODA, for example as sites of schools that receive Youth Volunteers for Nikkei 
Communities or which send trainees to Japan. 2) Nikkei communities act as advocates for bilateral 
economic cooperation, including aid. 3) Nikkeis might act as policymakers in the bilateral 
development assistance policy making process. Former president Fujimori would be the outstanding 
example of this type of role. 4) The discussion of South-south technical cooperation above suggests 
that the most fruitful role for Nikkei communities in LAC is to cooperate with Japan and their own 
governments in the provision of technical assistance to other countries in the region. To date, the 
first and fourth roles are most in evidence, with the first, Nikkeis as beneficiaries of technical 
assistance, the most prominent. 
However, it is not clear how effective these overseas communities are in the promotion of 
diplomatic and economic relations. JICA’s development assistance and emigration responsibilities 
remain formally separated, which makes seamless policy making between the two fields 
problematic. Nor is it clear whether the LAC Nikkei communities are interested in fulfilling such 
roles. The Dominican Republic is the site of one of Japan’s least successful migration policies, with 
emigrants in the end demanding reparations from the Government. Many first-generation 
immigrants are likely to view the Japanese government as the source of their difficulties rather than 
as a partner in the development of their newly adopted country. Peru is a more complicated case of 
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2012: ii).  
The author discerns four current and possible roles of Nikkei communities in development 
assistance. First, Nikkei communities are beneficiaries of ODA, for example as sites of schools that 
receive Youth Volunteers for Nikkei Communities or which send trainees to Japan. Support for 
Nikkei social development is included in the ODA budget, and the Youth Volunteers for Nikkei 
Communities program is part of the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers program. Second, 
Nikkei communities act as advocates for bilateral economic cooperation, including aid. The 2012 
Country Evaluation of Peru, cited above, made exactly this point. A 2010 Country Assistance 
Evaluation for Brazil noted the same in that country: “the Nikkei can be seen as an important asset 
for Japan in providing ODA to and building a strong partnership with Brazil, as their community as 
a whole has achieved remarkable development, in contrast with the previous situation in which they 
were mainly a target of Japan’s assistance” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 13). A 2004 JICA 
study on aid to Bolivia notes the same for the Nikkei community there (Institute for International 
Cooperation 2004: 37). 
Third, Nikkeis might act as policymakers in the bilateral development assistance policy 
making process. Former president Fujimori would be the outstanding example of this type of role. 
At the project level, the Nikkei presence is more widespread even as it is underappreciated. The 
Brazil Country Study notes that “the existence of immigrants from Japan and their descendants 
(Nikkei) in Brazil is a decisive factor promoting effective (aid) implementation. For instance, the 
development and dissemination of an agroforestry system in Northern Brazil, which has been 
contributing to forest conservation in the Amazon, could not have been possible without Nikkei 
farmers of Tomé-Açu in the State of Pará. Nikkei have participated in various technical cooperation 
projects as specialists or interpreter-cum-coordinators, facilitating technology transfer to and 
communication with Brazilian counterparts” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 13). In the Bolivian 
case, the 2004 report observes that “owing to the existence of Japanese associations in Bolivia, 
NGOs and Japanese local governments that intend to carry out international cooperation activities 
in Bolivia can easily find local partners. This may well promote public participation in cooperation 
projects…” (Institute for International Cooperation 2004: 37). Given the fact that evaluations of the 
Grassroots Human Security Grant program have pointed to the importance of assessing the capacity 
of local partner organizations in the effectiveness of project implementation, the presence of a 
known community familiar with Japanese organizations has the potential to enhance that important 
aid program in the region. 
The presence of Nikkei staff in JICA offices is an unremarked but important element of daily 
operations in LAC countries. Just under one half of the clerical staff of the JICA office in Santo 
Domingo, Dominican Republic, for example, are Nikkei hired locally. Like the Brazilian Nikkei 
noted above these staff members act as interpreters and project negotiators, fulfilling an important 
linkage function between the JICA office and its Dominican government counterparts8. 
                                                  
8 Author interview with JICA officials, Santo Domingo, August 10, 2015. 
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Those that remain on the list cluster in the Upper Middle Income category with less priority than 
Africa, parts of Asia, and the South Pacific microstates in terms of econ ic need. 
 
                     Table 2. Distribution of LAC Countries on he DAC  
List of ODA Recipients, 2014-16 
Develo ment level Number 
Least Developed 1 
Other Low Developed 0 
Lower Middle Income 6 
Upper Middle Income 22 
                       Source: DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for Reporting on 2014, 2015,  
                         and 2016 Flows. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm.  Accessed 5/23/2015. 
 
Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Pri e Minister Obuchi announced 
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime M ister, 2002: 27.  
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developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asi  comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international respons  to th  Latin
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” inspired b Japanese Ministry f
Fin nce policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled out of Latin America and international attention shifted to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spai , and Germany as w ll. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, fl ctin  larger repayment of outstandi g yen loans th n w
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest:
Japa  and South Korea toge her provide about five p rce t of the Inter-Americ n Bank
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the
Organ zation of American States. 
 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proporti n of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5.8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo Hakusho 2010. 
 
Th re are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s d velopment assistanc  
progr m. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and J pan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influence. A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view J pan’s presence in the region not a  
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell nd Imm rman 1992; And rson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be s en in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribb an have 
relatively high levels f economic development. According t  th  DAC, Antig a and Barbuda, 
Chile, a d Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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a successful emigrant community that in the 1990s produced a president. The legacy of Alberto 
Fujimori’s presidency, however, is controversial. 
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Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
                                                  
2 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 2002: 27.  
144 D. M. POTTER: JAPAN’S ASSISTANCE IN LAC 
development co peration, and the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development cooperation in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japan’s Aid to Latin America and the Caribbe n 
 
Since its inception in the 1960s Japan’s foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had 
developed a s -called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia comprisi g roughly 70 percent f total
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so- alled “Brady Plan” inspi ed by Japa ese Ministry of 
Finance policies (K ada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled ut of Latin America an  international attention shift d to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decr ased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecti g larger rep yment of outstanding yen loans than new
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Ja an’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South K rea together provide about five per ent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not m de a subscription to the 
Organization of Amer can States. 
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11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5 8 2.3 
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There are several reason  for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s development assistance 
program. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influenc . A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals th  tendency to view Japa ’s presence in t e region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
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development co peration, and the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development cooperation in order to augment the latter. 
 
 
Japan’s Aid to Latin America and the Caribbe n 
 
Since its inception in the 1960s Japan’s foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had 
developed a s -called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia comprisi g roughly 70 percent f total
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so- alled “Brady Plan” inspi ed by Japa ese Ministry of 
Finance policies (K ada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled ut of Latin America an  international attention shift d to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decr ased to its former levels and then dipped below 10 
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecti g larger rep yment of outstanding yen loans than new
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Ja an’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South K rea together provide about five per ent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not m de a subscription to the 
Organization of Amer can States. 
  Table 1. Aid to LAC as a proportion of total bilateral Japanese ODA（％） 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2009 
11.8 6.4 8.3 8.8 5.2 5 8 2.3 
 Source：Gaimusho, Waga Kuni no Seifu Kaihatsu Enjo 1997; Gaimusho, Seifu Kaihtsu Enjo Hakusho 2010. 
 
There are several reason  for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s development assistance 
program. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influenc . A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals th  tendency to view Japa ’s presence in t e region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Those that remain on the list cluster in the Upper Middle Income category with less priority than 
Africa, parts of Asi , and the South Pacific microstates i  terms of economic need. 
 
                   Table 2. Distribution of LAC Countries on the DAC  
List of OD  Recipients, 2014-16 
Development level Number 
Least Developed 1 
Other Low Developed 0 
Lower Middle Income 6 
Upper Middle Income 22 
                       Source: DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for Reporting on 2014, 2015,  
                         and 2016 Flows. www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm.  Accessed 5/23/2015. 
 
Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
 
 
Human Security and Aid to LAC 
 
The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
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development cooperation, and the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development coope ation in order to augment the latter. 
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Since its inception in the 1960s Japan’s foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had 
developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” in pired by Japanese Ministry of 
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled out of Latin America and international attention shifted to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecting larger repayment of outstanding yen loans than new 
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South Korea together provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the 
Organization of American States. 
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There are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s development assistance 
program. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influence. A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Japan’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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Third, Japan suffers from a problem of lack of presence in the region. As Japan’s aid budgets 
have shrunk and the LAC region’s share of Japan’s bilateral aid has diminished, Japan’s position 
among the DAC donors has also diminished: in LAC it is no longer top donor in most countries.  
The emergence of non-DAC donors, notably China, may further reduce Japan’s aid presence. Since 
2000 Japan has not appeared among the countries listed in Barometro Gobiernidad’s section, 
“Imagen de algunos actores internacionales,” unlike the United States, the EU, or, since 2004, 
China. A 2009 country report on aid to Ecuador found that Japan’s aid presence was not well-known 
in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009: 16). 
In sum, Japan’s economic cooperation relationship with LAC is roughly as reported in a 2002 
taskforce report on foreign policy submitted to then-prime minister Junichiro Koizumi: “(U)nlike 
Europe, Japan has no negative legacies in Latin America; this is a region where it can make use of 
its abilities and capacities without constraint.” It also noted that the presence of the Nikkeijin 
community in the region and their contributions to national development was an asset because they 
had helped foster interest in and admiration of the Japanese way of doing things. It concluded, 
however, that “Japan’s presence in Latin America has been steadily declining since the 1990s”2. 
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The end of the Cold War has produced new directions in Japan’s aid policy, including 
administrative reform and serious thinking about the purposes of aid. Saori Katada observes two 
trends in post-Cold War Japanese aid: on one hand it has become more nationalistic and tied more 
clearly to security issues, especially after 9/11, on the other it has come to better incorporate 
humanitarian concerns (Katada 2004). In this context, in 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi announced 
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development cooperation, and the possibilities for closer ties with the Nikkei community in LAC 
development coope ation in order to augment the latter. 
 
Japan’s Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Since its inception in the 1960s Japan’s foreign aid has focused on Asia. By the 1980s it had 
developed a so-called 7-1-1-1 formula, with aid to Asia comprising roughly 70 percent of total 
bilateral aid and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East each receiving about 10 percent 
(Yasutomo 1985: 41-49), Japan played a significant part in the international response to the Latin 
American debt crises of the 1980s, with the so-called “Brady Plan” in pired by Japanese Ministry of 
Finance policies (Katada 1997 2001; Katada and Solis 2010). However, in the 1990s, Japanese 
private banks pulled out of Latin America and international attention shifted to the Middle East and 
Africa. Japan’s aid to Latin America decreased to its former levels and then dipped below 10
percent in the late 1990s (see Table 1). Since 2000 Japan has ceded aid position not only to the 
United States but the European Union, Spain, and Germany as well. In 2010 and 2012, Japan’s net 
aid to the region was negative, reflecting larger repayment of outstanding yen loans than new 
commitment of grant and loan aid. Likewise, Japan’s support for regional development is modest: 
Japan and South Korea together provide about five percent of the Inter-American Bank 
subscriptions (Medina-Lopez 2006: 177). Since 2010 Japan has not made a subscription to the 
Organization of American States. 
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There are several reasons for Latin America’s low profile in Japan’s development assistance 
program. First, the United States has been the dominant power in the region and Japan has therefore 
tended to defer to it in what the Japanese government has viewed as the American sphere of 
influence. A survey of the literature on Japan’s economic cooperation with LAC even at its height in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s reveals the tendency to view Japan’s presence in the region not as 
Japan-LAC relations but rather as a triangular relationship involving Japan, LAC, and the United 
States (Kaufman, Purcell and Immerman 1992; Anderson 1993; Stallings and Szekely 1993; Katada 
2001). 
Second, as can be seen in Table 2, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
relatively high levels of economic development. According to the DAC, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Chile, and Uruguay are scheduled to graduate from ODA recipient status altogether in 2016.  
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